The Conferences of Heads of State from France and Africa (1980-1985)
7 th FRANCO-AFRICAN SUMMIT
NICE, MAY 8-9, 1980
The trilogue in the limelight
The 24 participants
Fifteen Heads of State:
Burundi: Colonel Jean-Baptiste Bagaza
Central Africa: David Dacko
Comoros: Ahmed Abdallah
Djibouti: Hassan Gouled
France: Valéry Giscard d’Estaing
Gabon: Omar Bongo
Equatorial Guinea: Obiang Nguéma Mbasogo
Mali: Colonel Moussa Traoré
Niger: Colonel Senyi Kountché
Rwanda: Major-General Juvénal Habyarimana
Senegal: Léopold Sédar Senghor
Sierra Leone: Siaka Stevens
Somalia: General Siad Barre
Togo: General Gnassingbé Eyadéma
Zaire: General Mobutu Sese Seko
Ten Ministerial delegations:
Benin: Ifédé Simon Ougouma, Minister of Foreign Affairs and of Cooperation
Cape Verde: David Hoppfer Almada, Minister of Justice
Chad: Colonel Kamougué, Vice President of the GUNT
Congo: Pierre Nzé, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Côte d’ivoire: Mathieu Ekra, Minister charged with the reform of state owned companies`
Guinea-Biassau: Vasco Cabral, State Commissioner for Economic Coordination and Planning
Morocco: M’Hamed Boucetta, Minister of State charged with Foreign Affairs and Cooperation
Mauritania: Mame N’Siack Seck, Ambassador to Paris
Sao Tomé and Principe: (not given)
Upper Volta: Captain Leonard Kalmogo, Minister of Finance
Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Morocco, Sao Tomé and Principe, Sierra Leone and Somalia took part in the conference as observers.
The Conference
Prepared by the Foreign Ministerial Conference in Paris on April 3 and 4, 1980, the 7th Franco-African Summit in Nice opened in a climate clouded by the Chadian crisis. The official statement from the GUNT Vice-President, Lieutenant-Colonel Kamougué, and the unofficial counter-statements from Hissène Habré, gave contradictory analyses of the situation in Chad.
But the most crucial problem faced by the participants remained finding ways to absorb the effects of the oil crisis and external deficits (for 12 Francophone African countries with no oil resources, the oil import bill, which had been 25 billion CFA in 1973, soared to 243 billion in 1980).
Another vital problem: food insufficiency was recorded in many African countries, especially in those of the Sahel region, which had been suffering drought (only 3 Sahelian countries were able to achieve the daily minimum nutritional 2,200 calories per person).
France offered solutions for all of these problems. Firstly, within the Franco-African framework, but also within the CAAD (Concerted Action for African Development), which strived to achieve a synthesis of the proposals from the six founding countries (France, Germany, USA, Belgium, Great Britain and Canada) and the priorities retained by African governments and international institutions.
However, discussions on the “trilogue” were the cornerstone of the 7th Franco-African Summit in Nice. It was demonstrated that the trilogue would not only aim at widening economic cooperation between African countries with no natural resources, Arab oil exporting countries and European countries with advanced technology, but also at bringing in a cultural dimension to permanent concerted efforts between Arab, African and European civilizations, united by natural affinities since antiquity and veering towards the universal.
8th FRANCO-AFRICAN SUMMIT
PARIS, NOVEMBER 3-4, 1981
Solidarity and development
The thirty two participants
Twenty Heads of State:
Benin: Colonel Mathieu Kerekou
Burundi: Colonel Jean-Baptiste Bagaza
Central Africa: General André Kolingba
Chad: Goukouni Weddeye
Comoros: Ahmed Abdallah
Congo: Denis Sassou-Nguesso
Côte d’Ivoire: Félix Houphouët-Boigny
Djibouti: Hassan Gouled
France: Francois Mitterrand
Gabon: Omar Bongo
Mali: Colonel Moussa Traoré
Mauritania: Lieutenant-Colonel Haïdalla
Niger: Colonel Senyi Kountché
Rwanda: Major-General Juvénal Habyarimana
Senegal: Abdou Diouf
Sierra Leone: Siaka Stevens
Somalia: General Siad Barre
Upper Volta: Colonel Sayé Zerbo
Togo: General Gnassingbé Eyadéma
Zaire: General Mobutu Sese Seko
Twelve Ministerial delgations
Angola: Venontio de Moura, Deputy Foreign Minister
Cape Verde: David Hopffar Almada, Minister of Justice
Egypt: Boutros-Ghali, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
Equatorial Guinea: Florenco Maye Ela Mangue, State Commissioner for Foreign Affairs
Guinea-Bissau: Victor Saudé Maria, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Mauritius: Sir Seewoosagur Ramgooçlam, Prime Minister
Morocco: M’Hamed Boucetta, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
Sao Tomé and Principe: Maria de Amorin, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Seychelles: Maxime Ferrari, Minister of Planning and Development
Sudan: Mohamed Mirgani, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Tunisia: Mohamed Mzali, Prime Minister, and Mahmoud Mestiri, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Zimbabwe: Kulbirai Kanghaï, Minister of Labor
The Conference
A Franco-African Summit had never brought together so many participants, not only French speaking countries, but also from English, Portuguese, Spanish and Arabic speaking nations. One can only conclude that it was the political change in France that came with the election of Francois Mitterrand six months earlier that convinced many states to take part in the Summit.
The change in French policy towards Africa was not only one of form, it was also one of content: “France is ready” President Mitterrand affirmed, “- when it corresponds to the decisions taken by the OAU - to offer its help and assure the means needed to guarantee your sovereignty. It is under these conditions that the principle of non interference, which is so often invoked and so often abused, will rediscover its true meaning.”
The French Head of State took this new way of speaking even further when he said he was convinced that “the solution to the drama of under-development does not lie in the implantation of export crops or industries based on inadequate technology and catering to the markets of developed countries.” He added: “Rather than the market capitalism orchestrated by the multi-nationals, we should prefer agricultural and industrial development which enhances human and natural resources and seeks to satisfy, above all, the basic needs of the population.”
It is not surprising that the Ivorian President, Houphouët-Boigny, speaking in his capacity as the senior Statesman, pointed out that the new French Head of State is “very near the African sensitivity.” He went on to underline that the French President’s “interest for the Third World has never wavered.”
The Chadian, Namibian and Western Saharan problems were dealt with at this 8th Summit, just as were those which arose when under-development was confronted with the world economic crisis. This crisis was hitting hardest the developing countries with whom France had expressed its solidarity.
The Outcome
Chad: The Conference agreed on “an aid to the government for the reconstruction of the country, for the rapid deployment of an inter-African force, the formation of an integrated army, the remodeling of the administration and on territorial integrity.”
France said it was ready to supply material and logistical aid in the setting up of an inter-African force.
Namibia: All the participants wished to see this former German colony administered by South Africa become independent.
The Western Sahara: The summit supported OAU efforts for the self-determination of the people concerned.
On the economic level, a call was issued to the international community to stabilize the prices of raw materials and for industrial conversion in the producer countries.
President Mitterrand affirmed that, as far as French aid was concerned, it would be brought up to 0.70% of the Gross National Product within a few years, of which 0.15% would go to the least developed countries.
9th FRANCO-AFRICAN SUMMIT
KINSHASA, OCTOBER 8-9, 1982
North-South dialogue faced with the world crisis
The 37 participants
Nineteen Heads of state
Benin: Colonel Mathieu Kerekou
Burundi: Colonel Jean-Baptiste Bagaza
Central Africa: André Kolingba
Chad: Hissène Habré
Comoros: Ahmed Abdallah
Congo: Denis Sassou-Nguesso
Côte d’Ivoire: Félix Houphouët-Boigny
Equatorial Guinea: Teodoro Obiang N’Guema
France: Francois Mitterrand
Gabon: Omar Bongo
Gambi: Sir Daouda Jawara
Mali: Moussa Traoré
Niger: Senyi Kountché
Rwanda: Major-General Juvénal Habyarimana
Senegal: Abdou Diouf
Sierra Leone: Siaka Stevens
Upper Volta: Sayé Zerbo
Togo: General Gnassingbé Eyadéma
Zaire: General Mobutu Sese Seko
Eighteen Ministerial delegations
Angola, Cape Verde, Djibouti, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sao Tomé and Principe, Seychelles, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
The Conference
Thirty-two countries were represented at the 8th summit in Paris. There were thirty-seven in Kinshasa. Among the newcomers: the West African giant Nigeria and the influential East African nation of Tanzania.
The 9th Conference in Kinshasa came at an especially important moment: it was held at a time when talking of the disintegration of the OAU was not just being overly pessimistic.
The summit of the pan-African organization, planned for Tripoli (Libya) in August 1982, turned out to be a missed opportunity. Worse still: the problem of the Western Sahara awoke the old demons of a split between “the progressive and moderate states” over the question of whether to admit the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) as a full member of the OAU. Although the organization had already survived severe crises this was the most serious one yet, with both sides refusing to make any concessions.
It was within this context of deadlock, which even looked like the eve of an explosion of the OAU, that 36 representatives from African states (among them 18 Heads of state) out of the 50 in the pan-African organization, gathered in Kinshasa. The quorum that was not reached in Tripoli was reached within a totally different framework in Kinshasa. From there, it was just one small step to suggest that this Franco-African Conference sought substitute itself for the OAU Summit, through the intermediary of France. An allegation that was easily made by those who, suspecting neocolonialism at every turn, failed to consider the diversity of the regimes in the different countries represented.
Thus, it was with good reason that President Mitterrand was determined to reaffirm in Kinshasa that the Franco-African Summit “is neither an institution, nor an organization. It intends to substitute itself for nobody, and especially not for the OAU. We have neither the mandate, nor the intention… ” The French President added: “It is up to Africans to determine for themselves, at the privileged level of the OAU.”
Faced with a world crisis which was hitting African countries ever harder, the French Head of State once again pleaded for a genuine North-South dialogue.
Beyond stigmatizing the disorganization of the international monetary system, the deterioration of the terms of exchange and pleading for a guaranteed minimum price for raw materials, for food self-sufficiency and the consolidation of the Lomé Accords, President Mitterrand was also determined to assure his colleagues that “France is with you and will remain at your side, you, the African states.”
But this reaffirmed solidarity should not mask the reality of what was possible. The French Head of State added that “France, caught in the torment of the crisis, cannot alone, take the place of the great countries who lag behind, have not understood and who have limited their world views to questions of military balance of power.”
This frank way of speaking was appreciated by France’s African partners. Addressing the French Head of State in the name of his African colleagues, President Mobutu said in fact that President Mitterrand was “the understanding partner, but without complacency, that Africa needs.” He also underlined Mitterrand’s “intelligence of /heart” which allowed him to “understand how much it is vital for Africa to fight against under-development.”
This 9th Conference of the Heads of State from France and Africa also established the legitimacy of Hissène Habré at the head of the Chadian state and this just a few months after he had overthrown the regime of Goukouni Weddeye. In fact, the other African Heads of State did not contest Habré’s participation in the slightest. Habré had held private talks at the Conference with the African leaders as well as with President Mitterrand. The latter said after his one-hour face-to-face meeting with the Chadian president that “a situation of rule of law now exists in Chad” and that “the Chadian state, which France recognizes, now has a central power.”
The Outcome
Chad: France decided to speed up payment to the country of credits written into the 1982 budget for a total of 63 million French francs. France would also help the reconstruction of Chad. A team of French experts would study in N’Djamena, the country’s needs.
Namibia: The Conference expressed the wish to see this country obtain independence in 1983. For its part, France would continue to play its role within the “Group of five” (The United States, West Germany, Great Britain, Canada and France), as the country that “awakes energy and consciences.”
On the economic level, the participants called for the massive ratification of an agreement for the establishment of a Common Fund for Commodities.
Global negotiations would also be carried out within the frameworks of the United Nations and UNCTAD for the stabilization of raw materials prices.
As far as French aid was concerned, President Mitterrand promised that it would reach 0.52% of GDP in 1982 and /0.70% in 1988.
10th FRANCO-AFRICAN SUMMIT
VITTEL, OCTOBER 3-4, 1983
Preserving the integrity of Chad
The 36 participants
Twenty-four Heads of State
Benin: Mathieu Kerekou
Burkina Faso (formally Upper Volta): Thomas Sankara
Burundi: Jean-Baptiste Bagaza
Chad: Hissène Habré
Comoros: Ahmed Abdallah
Congo: Denis Sassou-Nguesso
Côte d’Ivoire: Félix Houphouët-Boigny
Djibouti: Hassan Goulede Aptidon
Equatorial Guinea: Obiang N’Guema N’Basogo
France: Francois Mitterrand
Gabon: Omar Bongo
Gambia: Sir Daouda Jawara
Guinea: Sékou Touré
Guinea-Bissau: Jao Bernardo Nino Vieira
Mali: Moussa Traoré
Mauritania: Mohamed Khouna Ould Haïdalla
Niger: Senyi Kountché
Rwanda: Juvénal Habyarimana
Senegal: Abdou Diouf
Seychelles: France-Albert René
Sierra Leone: Siaka Stevens
Somalia: Mohamed Siad Barre
Togo: Gnassingbé Eyadéma
Zaire: Mobutu Sese Seko
One Head of Government
Mauritius: Aneerood Jugnauth
Eleven Ministerial delegations
Angola, Egypt, Kenya, Liberia, Morocco, Sao Tomé and Principe, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Zambia and Zimbabwe
The Conference
The Conference of Heads of State from France and Africa “is neither an institution, nor an organization. (It intends to substitute itself for nobody, and especially not for the OAU. We have neither the mandate, nor the intention… ” It is up to Africans to determine for themselves, at the privileged level of the OAU.”)
President Mitterrand wanted to reiterate the point he made in Kinshasa (1982) again at the 10th Conference held in Vittel on October 3-4, 1983.
This clarification was all the more necessary given that the Chadian problem - along with that of the Western Sahara - remained a thorny issue within the OAU. The Vittel Conference was in fact dominated by Chad, both within private discussions as well as within informal work sessions, while the pan-African organization, brought to a standstill by internal divisions, had thus far proven to be incapable to mediate the conflict between Chadians, a conflict in which Libya was playing a major role. All the participants in Vittel - including Hissène Habré - pronounced themselves in favor of inter-Chadian dialogue and of the territorial integrity of Chad. But differences did emerge among the Africans over what framework to give the discussions. Some, especially the Francophones, saw it as discussions between the legitimate government represented by Hissène Habré and the rebels. Others, such as Congo, wanted to put the GUNT and the regime in N’Djemna on the same footing. In French circles, it was felt that the intervention in Chad on the side of Hissène Habré within Operation “Manta”, which succeeded in freezing Libyan military operations in the field, put responsibility squarely upon the Africans to find a political solution. This attitude, however, drew some private criticism from those who felt Paris had a front line role to play in the quest for a political solution, if for no other reason than the influence the French could have over Colonel Kadhafi.
The Vittel Summit may not have achieved spectacular results but it did have the merit of clarifying a good number of points, the principal ones being:
Franco-African relations: “France has defined its priorities in aid to developing countries in order to fulfill its role in its relations with Africa.” President Mitterrand also reaffirmed France’s commitment to increase its aid, including within world financial bodies.
A call to the OAU: The Vittel Summit asked the pan-African organization to “commit itself wholeheartedly in the practical quest for the means of returning to peace in Chad.”
French military presence in Chad: “France went to Chad to answer the call from this country, to work for peace, a job which is obtainable only if the situation is created for it and this demands the respect of each party for the other. We will not be passive in our efforts” the French Head of State said. He also reaffirmed that “the French Army would not waste an hour getting back home once all foreign armies evacuate Chad, under international observation…”
Namibia: Evoking French participation in the Western Contact Group on Namibia, President Mitterrand made clear that “France could not indefinitely take part in a group which finds no solution… We will be patient and we will reactivate the debate which must lead to the independence of Namibia and to a cessation of hostilities and incursions, especially from Angola.”
The Western Sahara: Morocco (represented by the Crown Prince Sidi Mohamed) promised he would take the results of a referendum in the Western Sahara into consideration.
North-South: President Mitterrand denounced “the shortcomings of the monetary system, the absence of necessary cash flow from the International Monetary Fund and the timidity of the industrialized countries of the North who have not taken real decisions on the Rights for special cash withdrawals which could profit under-developed countries.”
11th FRANCO-AFRICAN SUMMIT
BUJUMBURA, DECEMBER 11-12, 1984
Food self-sufficiency, coordinated development
The 37 participants
Seventeen Heads of State
Burundi: Jean-Baptiste Bagaza
Central Africa: André Kolingba
Chad: Hissène Habré
Comoros: Ahmed Abdallah
Congo: Denis Sassou-Nguesso
Djibouti: Hassan Goulede Aptidon
Equatorial Guinea: Obiang N’Guema N’Basogo
France: Francois Mitterrand
Gabon: Omar Bongo
Mali: Moussa Traoré
Mauritania: Mohamed Khouna Ould Haïdalla
Rwanda: Juvénal Habyarimana
Sao Tomé and Principe: Manuel pinto da Costa
Senegal: Abdou Diouf
Seychelles: France-Albert René
Somalia: Mohamed Siad Barre
Zaire: Mobutu Sese Seko
Eighteen Ministerial delgations
Angola: Venancio de Moura, Vice-President for Foreign Affairs
Benin: Frédéric Affo, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Botswana: Mrs G.K. Chiepe, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Cape Verde: Antonio Lineelima, Ambassador
Côte d’Ivoire: Siméon Aké, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Egypt: Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Minsiter of State charged with Foreign Affairs
Gambia: Dr. Manuel, Minister of Planning
Guinea: Faciné Touré, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Guinea-Bissau: Vasco Cabral, Minister of State charge with Foreign Affairs
Liberia: Ernest Eastman, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Morocco: Abdellatif Filali, Minister of Information
Mozambique: Marcelino dos Santos, member of FRELIMO Political Bureau
Sudan: Hashim Osman, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Tanzania: Ndugu Benjamin Mkapa, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Togo: Atsé Koffi Améga, Minsiter of Foreign Affairs
Tunisia: Mamoud Mestiri, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Zambia: D.M. Lisulo, Chairman of the Judicial and Political Committee
Zimbabwe: Mr. Kangai, Minister of Technology
The Conference
If the 10th Conference of Heads of State from France and Africa in Vittel on October 3-4, 1983 was dominated by the Chadian problem, this was not the case for the 11th Summit held in Bujumbura. France’s Operation “Manta” deployed in Chad had stopped Libyan inclinations for conquest even though Colonel Kadhafi’s men still held the Aozou Strip. At the same time, the Congolese president, Sassou-Nguesso - with the blessings of his African peers and French encouragement - began attempts at reconciling the Chadian factions.
At this time of world economic crisis, worsened in Africa by drought, economic problems took center stage in the debates: debt, the stabilization of income and food self-sufficiency. For the first time in a Franco-African Summit, the participants raised the question of the arms race in Africa, which was sapping budgets to the detriment of economic development. By introducing this topic into the debates, the delegates, like Jean-Baptiste Bagaza of Burundi, wanted to underline a choice that had to be made at a time when the deadliest war Africa had thus far known was named drought and its corollary was called famine. It was no time for a catalogue of grievances, nor one for empty wishes. Faced with the urgency and the acuteness of the problem, it was time for Africa to mobilize, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, for its food self-sufficiency and for coordinated development.
President Mitterrand also took up the subject, underlining that: “It seems to me to be essential that, from now on, the necessities for rural development be taken into account in all their complexities… To help peasant communities to feed themselves and to contribute to the food security of their countries is the ambition of our support to adapted food strategies, whose elaboration and monitoring are the sovereign responsibility of the recipient states. That is also the new orientation given to French food aid. Indispensable for dealing with famine or structural food deficiency, this emergency aid can only be useful if it accompanies, rather than goes against, the efforts of each country to obtain its own food security. Everywhere, training in the field and the transfer of technologies are becoming essential for countries to obtain, on their own, and to hold on to, the means for their development…”
President Mitterrand also reminded his listeners of French willingness to continue to help development in Africa, a continent that was already receiving “more than two-thirds of all French public participation in development. It is our duty, but it is also our choice.”
The Outcome
It is not superfluous to restate here that the Franco-African Summit is not a decision making body. It is rather a meeting for exchanging ideas and brainstorming together to look for concerted solutions. These joint discussions turned out to be a mobilizing factor for all the participating states.
There were two concrete decisions made by the French Head of State, which should be retained.
The creation of a special fund for Africa: France said it was ready to participate in this fund with those countries ready to follow its lead in this direction. Paris reserved a first contribution of 500 million francs, which Paris had already been included in its budget.
The creation of an Africa House in Paris: President Mitterrand said the house would be “a place where all those who participate in our common attempt to affirm a certain kind of civilization could comfortably assemble; not only the politicians, but the others as well, the men of culture, businessmen, those who express themselves and those who trade, the press; all those who, in one way or another, can contribute to our efforts …”
12th FRANCO-AFRICAN SUMMIT
PARIS, DECEMBER 11-12-13, 1985
The growing African debt
The 34 participants
Eighteen Heads of State
Benin: Mathieu Kerekou
Burundi: Jean-Baptiste Bagaza
Central Africa: André Kolingba
Chad: Hissène Habré
Comoros: Ahmed Abdallah Abderamane
Congo: Denis Sassou-Nguesso
Côte d’Ivoire: Félix Houphouët-Boigny
Djibouti: Hassan Goulede Aptidon
Equatorial Guinea: Obiang N’Guema N’Basogo
France: Francois Mitterrand
Gabon: Omar Bongo
Mali: Moussa Traoré
Morocco: King Hassan II
Mauritania: Maaouya Ouldd Sid Ahmed Taya
Niger: Seyni Kountché
Rwanda: Juvénal Habyarimana
Senegal: Abdou Diouf
Togo: Gnassingbé Eyadéma
Zaire: Mobutu Sese Seko
One Vice-President
Mozambique: Marcelino dos Santos
Three Heads of Government
Equatorial Guinea: Don Cristino Seriche Bioko
Mauritius: Annerood Jugauth
Sudan: El Gizouli Dafaalla
Ten Ministerial delegations
Angola: Ismaël Martins, Minister of Foreign Trade
Cape Verde: Aguinaldo Lisboa Ramos, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Egypt: Boutors Boutros-Ghali, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
Gambia: Lamine Kitti Jabang, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Guinea: Faciné Touré, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation
Guinea-Bissau: Fidelis Cabral de Almada, Minister of Education, Culture and Sport
Seychelles: Jacques Hodoul, Minister of National Development
Somalia: Abdirahman Jama Barre, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Tanzania: Benjamin Mkapa; Minister of Foreign Affairs
Tunisia: Beji Caïd Essebsi, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Two Representations
Botswana: AM Dube, Consular Minister at the Paris Embassy
Zambia: Ben Kufakuneso Jambga, Ambassador to France
The Conference
Chad came back into the limelight during this 12th Conference of Heads of State from France and Africa, which met in Paris on December 11-13, 1985. In the meantime, the Franco-Libyan Accord of September 1984 had been signed. This Accord stipulated simultaneous withdrawal of French and Libyan troops from Chad. Only France respected the clauses in the Accord. Libya, for its part, reinforced its positions in Northern Chad. Many African Heads of State, surprised by the Libyan boldness, asked what Paris was waiting for to kick Libya's troops out of the North of Chad.
As far as France was concerned, Paris would stick to its word. President Mitterrand recalled that “there is a reality, and this reality is that Chad is a friend of France",and that "France will never consent…to consider that there could be a partition of Chad."
But the Chadian problem obviously did not constitute the essential topic debated at the 12th Summit. The growing debt of African countries was one of the most worrying issues, coming at a time when erratic weather conditions continued to destroy crops (and thus efforts at food self-sufficiency), a time when raw materials rates were at new lows and when the dollar's swings upset all planning. The result was that African states, despite their efforts at development were falling further behind.
“In fact,” President Mitterrand underlined, “if sub-Saharan African debt - with more than 70 billion dollars - seems low in relationship to the overall debt of the developing nations, which exceeds 950 billion dollars, it is all the same a very heavy burden, much too heavy for the economies of African countries…”
And Mitterrand reminded the assembly "that I speak the same language before other bodies. I spoke it in Bonn recently, at the last Summit of Industrialized Nations, by refusing, for example, too great a precipitation in the opening of a new round of negotiations in GATT, which, after all, seems to me to be desirable, on the condition that there is no agreement reached to the detriment of the greatest number and especially the countries of the Third-World, who need the accord… We cannot meet on an international level with the unique goal of increasing the advantages of the most wealthy."
President Mitterrand reaffirmed that, concretely, as far as France was concerned, it was his country’s intention “to continue its development aid efforts which have gone from 0.36% of GNP in 1981, to 0.55% in 1985, of which 0.15% is destined to the least developed countries, in conformity with the commitments that I had made during the Paris Conference, and we will go to the 0.7% recommended by the United Nations…”
Other subjects debated Africans and their French counterpart:
Western Sahara: France reaffirmed its position for a referendum under international control. Thus “once this people have expressed themselves, each will bow before their will…”
South Africa: “A truly inadmissible challenge for the international community. From the declaration of the State of Emergency (July 1985), the French government decided to suspend all new investment. It recalled its ambassador and its military attaché. It referred the matter to the United Nations Security Council to obtain the adoption, on July 26, 1985, of Resolution 569 which called on member states to take restrictive measures against the country where the odious system of Apartheid is maintained…”
Comoros - Mayotte: “It is a delicate problem … We are working under conditions of exceptional mutual understanding with (Comoro) President Abdallah, who defends the position I defended in parliament in 1974… The law separating Mayotte from the independent Comoros is an error…”
One new element at the summit was the participation of a Maghreb country, Morocco, represented by King Hassan II in person. Up to then, Rabat had only been represented at a Ministerial level, as was Tunis, while Algeria had never taken part.
The Outcome
The convening of an extraordinary session of the United Nations on African debt: France backed and supported the OAU position because “we had a dialogue with the acting Chairman of the OAU ( President Abdou Diouf) and we realized that our intentions converge…”
The founding of a new Africa House in Paris, which had been suggested by President Mitterrand at the 11th Summit in Bujumbura: the model of the planned building was made. The site for the new building was being studied.
NICE, MAY 8-9, 1980
The trilogue in the limelight
The 24 participants
Fifteen Heads of State:
Burundi: Colonel Jean-Baptiste Bagaza
Central Africa: David Dacko
Comoros: Ahmed Abdallah
Djibouti: Hassan Gouled
France: Valéry Giscard d’Estaing
Gabon: Omar Bongo
Equatorial Guinea: Obiang Nguéma Mbasogo
Mali: Colonel Moussa Traoré
Niger: Colonel Senyi Kountché
Rwanda: Major-General Juvénal Habyarimana
Senegal: Léopold Sédar Senghor
Sierra Leone: Siaka Stevens
Somalia: General Siad Barre
Togo: General Gnassingbé Eyadéma
Zaire: General Mobutu Sese Seko
Ten Ministerial delegations:
Benin: Ifédé Simon Ougouma, Minister of Foreign Affairs and of Cooperation
Cape Verde: David Hoppfer Almada, Minister of Justice
Chad: Colonel Kamougué, Vice President of the GUNT
Congo: Pierre Nzé, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Côte d’ivoire: Mathieu Ekra, Minister charged with the reform of state owned companies`
Guinea-Biassau: Vasco Cabral, State Commissioner for Economic Coordination and Planning
Morocco: M’Hamed Boucetta, Minister of State charged with Foreign Affairs and Cooperation
Mauritania: Mame N’Siack Seck, Ambassador to Paris
Sao Tomé and Principe: (not given)
Upper Volta: Captain Leonard Kalmogo, Minister of Finance
Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Morocco, Sao Tomé and Principe, Sierra Leone and Somalia took part in the conference as observers.
The Conference
Prepared by the Foreign Ministerial Conference in Paris on April 3 and 4, 1980, the 7th Franco-African Summit in Nice opened in a climate clouded by the Chadian crisis. The official statement from the GUNT Vice-President, Lieutenant-Colonel Kamougué, and the unofficial counter-statements from Hissène Habré, gave contradictory analyses of the situation in Chad.
But the most crucial problem faced by the participants remained finding ways to absorb the effects of the oil crisis and external deficits (for 12 Francophone African countries with no oil resources, the oil import bill, which had been 25 billion CFA in 1973, soared to 243 billion in 1980).
Another vital problem: food insufficiency was recorded in many African countries, especially in those of the Sahel region, which had been suffering drought (only 3 Sahelian countries were able to achieve the daily minimum nutritional 2,200 calories per person).
France offered solutions for all of these problems. Firstly, within the Franco-African framework, but also within the CAAD (Concerted Action for African Development), which strived to achieve a synthesis of the proposals from the six founding countries (France, Germany, USA, Belgium, Great Britain and Canada) and the priorities retained by African governments and international institutions.
However, discussions on the “trilogue” were the cornerstone of the 7th Franco-African Summit in Nice. It was demonstrated that the trilogue would not only aim at widening economic cooperation between African countries with no natural resources, Arab oil exporting countries and European countries with advanced technology, but also at bringing in a cultural dimension to permanent concerted efforts between Arab, African and European civilizations, united by natural affinities since antiquity and veering towards the universal.
8th FRANCO-AFRICAN SUMMIT
PARIS, NOVEMBER 3-4, 1981
Solidarity and development
The thirty two participants
Twenty Heads of State:
Benin: Colonel Mathieu Kerekou
Burundi: Colonel Jean-Baptiste Bagaza
Central Africa: General André Kolingba
Chad: Goukouni Weddeye
Comoros: Ahmed Abdallah
Congo: Denis Sassou-Nguesso
Côte d’Ivoire: Félix Houphouët-Boigny
Djibouti: Hassan Gouled
France: Francois Mitterrand
Gabon: Omar Bongo
Mali: Colonel Moussa Traoré
Mauritania: Lieutenant-Colonel Haïdalla
Niger: Colonel Senyi Kountché
Rwanda: Major-General Juvénal Habyarimana
Senegal: Abdou Diouf
Sierra Leone: Siaka Stevens
Somalia: General Siad Barre
Upper Volta: Colonel Sayé Zerbo
Togo: General Gnassingbé Eyadéma
Zaire: General Mobutu Sese Seko
Twelve Ministerial delgations
Angola: Venontio de Moura, Deputy Foreign Minister
Cape Verde: David Hopffar Almada, Minister of Justice
Egypt: Boutros-Ghali, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
Equatorial Guinea: Florenco Maye Ela Mangue, State Commissioner for Foreign Affairs
Guinea-Bissau: Victor Saudé Maria, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Mauritius: Sir Seewoosagur Ramgooçlam, Prime Minister
Morocco: M’Hamed Boucetta, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
Sao Tomé and Principe: Maria de Amorin, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Seychelles: Maxime Ferrari, Minister of Planning and Development
Sudan: Mohamed Mirgani, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Tunisia: Mohamed Mzali, Prime Minister, and Mahmoud Mestiri, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Zimbabwe: Kulbirai Kanghaï, Minister of Labor
The Conference
A Franco-African Summit had never brought together so many participants, not only French speaking countries, but also from English, Portuguese, Spanish and Arabic speaking nations. One can only conclude that it was the political change in France that came with the election of Francois Mitterrand six months earlier that convinced many states to take part in the Summit.
The change in French policy towards Africa was not only one of form, it was also one of content: “France is ready” President Mitterrand affirmed, “- when it corresponds to the decisions taken by the OAU - to offer its help and assure the means needed to guarantee your sovereignty. It is under these conditions that the principle of non interference, which is so often invoked and so often abused, will rediscover its true meaning.”
The French Head of State took this new way of speaking even further when he said he was convinced that “the solution to the drama of under-development does not lie in the implantation of export crops or industries based on inadequate technology and catering to the markets of developed countries.” He added: “Rather than the market capitalism orchestrated by the multi-nationals, we should prefer agricultural and industrial development which enhances human and natural resources and seeks to satisfy, above all, the basic needs of the population.”
It is not surprising that the Ivorian President, Houphouët-Boigny, speaking in his capacity as the senior Statesman, pointed out that the new French Head of State is “very near the African sensitivity.” He went on to underline that the French President’s “interest for the Third World has never wavered.”
The Chadian, Namibian and Western Saharan problems were dealt with at this 8th Summit, just as were those which arose when under-development was confronted with the world economic crisis. This crisis was hitting hardest the developing countries with whom France had expressed its solidarity.
The Outcome
Chad: The Conference agreed on “an aid to the government for the reconstruction of the country, for the rapid deployment of an inter-African force, the formation of an integrated army, the remodeling of the administration and on territorial integrity.”
France said it was ready to supply material and logistical aid in the setting up of an inter-African force.
Namibia: All the participants wished to see this former German colony administered by South Africa become independent.
The Western Sahara: The summit supported OAU efforts for the self-determination of the people concerned.
On the economic level, a call was issued to the international community to stabilize the prices of raw materials and for industrial conversion in the producer countries.
President Mitterrand affirmed that, as far as French aid was concerned, it would be brought up to 0.70% of the Gross National Product within a few years, of which 0.15% would go to the least developed countries.
9th FRANCO-AFRICAN SUMMIT
KINSHASA, OCTOBER 8-9, 1982
North-South dialogue faced with the world crisis
The 37 participants
Nineteen Heads of state
Benin: Colonel Mathieu Kerekou
Burundi: Colonel Jean-Baptiste Bagaza
Central Africa: André Kolingba
Chad: Hissène Habré
Comoros: Ahmed Abdallah
Congo: Denis Sassou-Nguesso
Côte d’Ivoire: Félix Houphouët-Boigny
Equatorial Guinea: Teodoro Obiang N’Guema
France: Francois Mitterrand
Gabon: Omar Bongo
Gambi: Sir Daouda Jawara
Mali: Moussa Traoré
Niger: Senyi Kountché
Rwanda: Major-General Juvénal Habyarimana
Senegal: Abdou Diouf
Sierra Leone: Siaka Stevens
Upper Volta: Sayé Zerbo
Togo: General Gnassingbé Eyadéma
Zaire: General Mobutu Sese Seko
Eighteen Ministerial delegations
Angola, Cape Verde, Djibouti, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sao Tomé and Principe, Seychelles, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
The Conference
Thirty-two countries were represented at the 8th summit in Paris. There were thirty-seven in Kinshasa. Among the newcomers: the West African giant Nigeria and the influential East African nation of Tanzania.
The 9th Conference in Kinshasa came at an especially important moment: it was held at a time when talking of the disintegration of the OAU was not just being overly pessimistic.
The summit of the pan-African organization, planned for Tripoli (Libya) in August 1982, turned out to be a missed opportunity. Worse still: the problem of the Western Sahara awoke the old demons of a split between “the progressive and moderate states” over the question of whether to admit the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) as a full member of the OAU. Although the organization had already survived severe crises this was the most serious one yet, with both sides refusing to make any concessions.
It was within this context of deadlock, which even looked like the eve of an explosion of the OAU, that 36 representatives from African states (among them 18 Heads of state) out of the 50 in the pan-African organization, gathered in Kinshasa. The quorum that was not reached in Tripoli was reached within a totally different framework in Kinshasa. From there, it was just one small step to suggest that this Franco-African Conference sought substitute itself for the OAU Summit, through the intermediary of France. An allegation that was easily made by those who, suspecting neocolonialism at every turn, failed to consider the diversity of the regimes in the different countries represented.
Thus, it was with good reason that President Mitterrand was determined to reaffirm in Kinshasa that the Franco-African Summit “is neither an institution, nor an organization. It intends to substitute itself for nobody, and especially not for the OAU. We have neither the mandate, nor the intention… ” The French President added: “It is up to Africans to determine for themselves, at the privileged level of the OAU.”
Faced with a world crisis which was hitting African countries ever harder, the French Head of State once again pleaded for a genuine North-South dialogue.
Beyond stigmatizing the disorganization of the international monetary system, the deterioration of the terms of exchange and pleading for a guaranteed minimum price for raw materials, for food self-sufficiency and the consolidation of the Lomé Accords, President Mitterrand was also determined to assure his colleagues that “France is with you and will remain at your side, you, the African states.”
But this reaffirmed solidarity should not mask the reality of what was possible. The French Head of State added that “France, caught in the torment of the crisis, cannot alone, take the place of the great countries who lag behind, have not understood and who have limited their world views to questions of military balance of power.”
This frank way of speaking was appreciated by France’s African partners. Addressing the French Head of State in the name of his African colleagues, President Mobutu said in fact that President Mitterrand was “the understanding partner, but without complacency, that Africa needs.” He also underlined Mitterrand’s “intelligence of /heart” which allowed him to “understand how much it is vital for Africa to fight against under-development.”
This 9th Conference of the Heads of State from France and Africa also established the legitimacy of Hissène Habré at the head of the Chadian state and this just a few months after he had overthrown the regime of Goukouni Weddeye. In fact, the other African Heads of State did not contest Habré’s participation in the slightest. Habré had held private talks at the Conference with the African leaders as well as with President Mitterrand. The latter said after his one-hour face-to-face meeting with the Chadian president that “a situation of rule of law now exists in Chad” and that “the Chadian state, which France recognizes, now has a central power.”
The Outcome
Chad: France decided to speed up payment to the country of credits written into the 1982 budget for a total of 63 million French francs. France would also help the reconstruction of Chad. A team of French experts would study in N’Djamena, the country’s needs.
Namibia: The Conference expressed the wish to see this country obtain independence in 1983. For its part, France would continue to play its role within the “Group of five” (The United States, West Germany, Great Britain, Canada and France), as the country that “awakes energy and consciences.”
On the economic level, the participants called for the massive ratification of an agreement for the establishment of a Common Fund for Commodities.
Global negotiations would also be carried out within the frameworks of the United Nations and UNCTAD for the stabilization of raw materials prices.
As far as French aid was concerned, President Mitterrand promised that it would reach 0.52% of GDP in 1982 and /0.70% in 1988.
10th FRANCO-AFRICAN SUMMIT
VITTEL, OCTOBER 3-4, 1983
Preserving the integrity of Chad
The 36 participants
Twenty-four Heads of State
Benin: Mathieu Kerekou
Burkina Faso (formally Upper Volta): Thomas Sankara
Burundi: Jean-Baptiste Bagaza
Chad: Hissène Habré
Comoros: Ahmed Abdallah
Congo: Denis Sassou-Nguesso
Côte d’Ivoire: Félix Houphouët-Boigny
Djibouti: Hassan Goulede Aptidon
Equatorial Guinea: Obiang N’Guema N’Basogo
France: Francois Mitterrand
Gabon: Omar Bongo
Gambia: Sir Daouda Jawara
Guinea: Sékou Touré
Guinea-Bissau: Jao Bernardo Nino Vieira
Mali: Moussa Traoré
Mauritania: Mohamed Khouna Ould Haïdalla
Niger: Senyi Kountché
Rwanda: Juvénal Habyarimana
Senegal: Abdou Diouf
Seychelles: France-Albert René
Sierra Leone: Siaka Stevens
Somalia: Mohamed Siad Barre
Togo: Gnassingbé Eyadéma
Zaire: Mobutu Sese Seko
One Head of Government
Mauritius: Aneerood Jugnauth
Eleven Ministerial delegations
Angola, Egypt, Kenya, Liberia, Morocco, Sao Tomé and Principe, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Zambia and Zimbabwe
The Conference
The Conference of Heads of State from France and Africa “is neither an institution, nor an organization. (It intends to substitute itself for nobody, and especially not for the OAU. We have neither the mandate, nor the intention… ” It is up to Africans to determine for themselves, at the privileged level of the OAU.”)
President Mitterrand wanted to reiterate the point he made in Kinshasa (1982) again at the 10th Conference held in Vittel on October 3-4, 1983.
This clarification was all the more necessary given that the Chadian problem - along with that of the Western Sahara - remained a thorny issue within the OAU. The Vittel Conference was in fact dominated by Chad, both within private discussions as well as within informal work sessions, while the pan-African organization, brought to a standstill by internal divisions, had thus far proven to be incapable to mediate the conflict between Chadians, a conflict in which Libya was playing a major role. All the participants in Vittel - including Hissène Habré - pronounced themselves in favor of inter-Chadian dialogue and of the territorial integrity of Chad. But differences did emerge among the Africans over what framework to give the discussions. Some, especially the Francophones, saw it as discussions between the legitimate government represented by Hissène Habré and the rebels. Others, such as Congo, wanted to put the GUNT and the regime in N’Djemna on the same footing. In French circles, it was felt that the intervention in Chad on the side of Hissène Habré within Operation “Manta”, which succeeded in freezing Libyan military operations in the field, put responsibility squarely upon the Africans to find a political solution. This attitude, however, drew some private criticism from those who felt Paris had a front line role to play in the quest for a political solution, if for no other reason than the influence the French could have over Colonel Kadhafi.
The Vittel Summit may not have achieved spectacular results but it did have the merit of clarifying a good number of points, the principal ones being:
Franco-African relations: “France has defined its priorities in aid to developing countries in order to fulfill its role in its relations with Africa.” President Mitterrand also reaffirmed France’s commitment to increase its aid, including within world financial bodies.
A call to the OAU: The Vittel Summit asked the pan-African organization to “commit itself wholeheartedly in the practical quest for the means of returning to peace in Chad.”
French military presence in Chad: “France went to Chad to answer the call from this country, to work for peace, a job which is obtainable only if the situation is created for it and this demands the respect of each party for the other. We will not be passive in our efforts” the French Head of State said. He also reaffirmed that “the French Army would not waste an hour getting back home once all foreign armies evacuate Chad, under international observation…”
Namibia: Evoking French participation in the Western Contact Group on Namibia, President Mitterrand made clear that “France could not indefinitely take part in a group which finds no solution… We will be patient and we will reactivate the debate which must lead to the independence of Namibia and to a cessation of hostilities and incursions, especially from Angola.”
The Western Sahara: Morocco (represented by the Crown Prince Sidi Mohamed) promised he would take the results of a referendum in the Western Sahara into consideration.
North-South: President Mitterrand denounced “the shortcomings of the monetary system, the absence of necessary cash flow from the International Monetary Fund and the timidity of the industrialized countries of the North who have not taken real decisions on the Rights for special cash withdrawals which could profit under-developed countries.”
11th FRANCO-AFRICAN SUMMIT
BUJUMBURA, DECEMBER 11-12, 1984
Food self-sufficiency, coordinated development
The 37 participants
Seventeen Heads of State
Burundi: Jean-Baptiste Bagaza
Central Africa: André Kolingba
Chad: Hissène Habré
Comoros: Ahmed Abdallah
Congo: Denis Sassou-Nguesso
Djibouti: Hassan Goulede Aptidon
Equatorial Guinea: Obiang N’Guema N’Basogo
France: Francois Mitterrand
Gabon: Omar Bongo
Mali: Moussa Traoré
Mauritania: Mohamed Khouna Ould Haïdalla
Rwanda: Juvénal Habyarimana
Sao Tomé and Principe: Manuel pinto da Costa
Senegal: Abdou Diouf
Seychelles: France-Albert René
Somalia: Mohamed Siad Barre
Zaire: Mobutu Sese Seko
Eighteen Ministerial delgations
Angola: Venancio de Moura, Vice-President for Foreign Affairs
Benin: Frédéric Affo, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Botswana: Mrs G.K. Chiepe, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Cape Verde: Antonio Lineelima, Ambassador
Côte d’Ivoire: Siméon Aké, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Egypt: Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Minsiter of State charged with Foreign Affairs
Gambia: Dr. Manuel, Minister of Planning
Guinea: Faciné Touré, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Guinea-Bissau: Vasco Cabral, Minister of State charge with Foreign Affairs
Liberia: Ernest Eastman, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Morocco: Abdellatif Filali, Minister of Information
Mozambique: Marcelino dos Santos, member of FRELIMO Political Bureau
Sudan: Hashim Osman, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Tanzania: Ndugu Benjamin Mkapa, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Togo: Atsé Koffi Améga, Minsiter of Foreign Affairs
Tunisia: Mamoud Mestiri, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Zambia: D.M. Lisulo, Chairman of the Judicial and Political Committee
Zimbabwe: Mr. Kangai, Minister of Technology
The Conference
If the 10th Conference of Heads of State from France and Africa in Vittel on October 3-4, 1983 was dominated by the Chadian problem, this was not the case for the 11th Summit held in Bujumbura. France’s Operation “Manta” deployed in Chad had stopped Libyan inclinations for conquest even though Colonel Kadhafi’s men still held the Aozou Strip. At the same time, the Congolese president, Sassou-Nguesso - with the blessings of his African peers and French encouragement - began attempts at reconciling the Chadian factions.
At this time of world economic crisis, worsened in Africa by drought, economic problems took center stage in the debates: debt, the stabilization of income and food self-sufficiency. For the first time in a Franco-African Summit, the participants raised the question of the arms race in Africa, which was sapping budgets to the detriment of economic development. By introducing this topic into the debates, the delegates, like Jean-Baptiste Bagaza of Burundi, wanted to underline a choice that had to be made at a time when the deadliest war Africa had thus far known was named drought and its corollary was called famine. It was no time for a catalogue of grievances, nor one for empty wishes. Faced with the urgency and the acuteness of the problem, it was time for Africa to mobilize, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, for its food self-sufficiency and for coordinated development.
President Mitterrand also took up the subject, underlining that: “It seems to me to be essential that, from now on, the necessities for rural development be taken into account in all their complexities… To help peasant communities to feed themselves and to contribute to the food security of their countries is the ambition of our support to adapted food strategies, whose elaboration and monitoring are the sovereign responsibility of the recipient states. That is also the new orientation given to French food aid. Indispensable for dealing with famine or structural food deficiency, this emergency aid can only be useful if it accompanies, rather than goes against, the efforts of each country to obtain its own food security. Everywhere, training in the field and the transfer of technologies are becoming essential for countries to obtain, on their own, and to hold on to, the means for their development…”
President Mitterrand also reminded his listeners of French willingness to continue to help development in Africa, a continent that was already receiving “more than two-thirds of all French public participation in development. It is our duty, but it is also our choice.”
The Outcome
It is not superfluous to restate here that the Franco-African Summit is not a decision making body. It is rather a meeting for exchanging ideas and brainstorming together to look for concerted solutions. These joint discussions turned out to be a mobilizing factor for all the participating states.
There were two concrete decisions made by the French Head of State, which should be retained.
The creation of a special fund for Africa: France said it was ready to participate in this fund with those countries ready to follow its lead in this direction. Paris reserved a first contribution of 500 million francs, which Paris had already been included in its budget.
The creation of an Africa House in Paris: President Mitterrand said the house would be “a place where all those who participate in our common attempt to affirm a certain kind of civilization could comfortably assemble; not only the politicians, but the others as well, the men of culture, businessmen, those who express themselves and those who trade, the press; all those who, in one way or another, can contribute to our efforts …”
12th FRANCO-AFRICAN SUMMIT
PARIS, DECEMBER 11-12-13, 1985
The growing African debt
The 34 participants
Eighteen Heads of State
Benin: Mathieu Kerekou
Burundi: Jean-Baptiste Bagaza
Central Africa: André Kolingba
Chad: Hissène Habré
Comoros: Ahmed Abdallah Abderamane
Congo: Denis Sassou-Nguesso
Côte d’Ivoire: Félix Houphouët-Boigny
Djibouti: Hassan Goulede Aptidon
Equatorial Guinea: Obiang N’Guema N’Basogo
France: Francois Mitterrand
Gabon: Omar Bongo
Mali: Moussa Traoré
Morocco: King Hassan II
Mauritania: Maaouya Ouldd Sid Ahmed Taya
Niger: Seyni Kountché
Rwanda: Juvénal Habyarimana
Senegal: Abdou Diouf
Togo: Gnassingbé Eyadéma
Zaire: Mobutu Sese Seko
One Vice-President
Mozambique: Marcelino dos Santos
Three Heads of Government
Equatorial Guinea: Don Cristino Seriche Bioko
Mauritius: Annerood Jugauth
Sudan: El Gizouli Dafaalla
Ten Ministerial delegations
Angola: Ismaël Martins, Minister of Foreign Trade
Cape Verde: Aguinaldo Lisboa Ramos, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Egypt: Boutors Boutros-Ghali, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
Gambia: Lamine Kitti Jabang, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Guinea: Faciné Touré, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation
Guinea-Bissau: Fidelis Cabral de Almada, Minister of Education, Culture and Sport
Seychelles: Jacques Hodoul, Minister of National Development
Somalia: Abdirahman Jama Barre, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Tanzania: Benjamin Mkapa; Minister of Foreign Affairs
Tunisia: Beji Caïd Essebsi, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Two Representations
Botswana: AM Dube, Consular Minister at the Paris Embassy
Zambia: Ben Kufakuneso Jambga, Ambassador to France
The Conference
Chad came back into the limelight during this 12th Conference of Heads of State from France and Africa, which met in Paris on December 11-13, 1985. In the meantime, the Franco-Libyan Accord of September 1984 had been signed. This Accord stipulated simultaneous withdrawal of French and Libyan troops from Chad. Only France respected the clauses in the Accord. Libya, for its part, reinforced its positions in Northern Chad. Many African Heads of State, surprised by the Libyan boldness, asked what Paris was waiting for to kick Libya's troops out of the North of Chad.
As far as France was concerned, Paris would stick to its word. President Mitterrand recalled that “there is a reality, and this reality is that Chad is a friend of France",and that "France will never consent…to consider that there could be a partition of Chad."
But the Chadian problem obviously did not constitute the essential topic debated at the 12th Summit. The growing debt of African countries was one of the most worrying issues, coming at a time when erratic weather conditions continued to destroy crops (and thus efforts at food self-sufficiency), a time when raw materials rates were at new lows and when the dollar's swings upset all planning. The result was that African states, despite their efforts at development were falling further behind.
“In fact,” President Mitterrand underlined, “if sub-Saharan African debt - with more than 70 billion dollars - seems low in relationship to the overall debt of the developing nations, which exceeds 950 billion dollars, it is all the same a very heavy burden, much too heavy for the economies of African countries…”
And Mitterrand reminded the assembly "that I speak the same language before other bodies. I spoke it in Bonn recently, at the last Summit of Industrialized Nations, by refusing, for example, too great a precipitation in the opening of a new round of negotiations in GATT, which, after all, seems to me to be desirable, on the condition that there is no agreement reached to the detriment of the greatest number and especially the countries of the Third-World, who need the accord… We cannot meet on an international level with the unique goal of increasing the advantages of the most wealthy."
President Mitterrand reaffirmed that, concretely, as far as France was concerned, it was his country’s intention “to continue its development aid efforts which have gone from 0.36% of GNP in 1981, to 0.55% in 1985, of which 0.15% is destined to the least developed countries, in conformity with the commitments that I had made during the Paris Conference, and we will go to the 0.7% recommended by the United Nations…”
Other subjects debated Africans and their French counterpart:
Western Sahara: France reaffirmed its position for a referendum under international control. Thus “once this people have expressed themselves, each will bow before their will…”
South Africa: “A truly inadmissible challenge for the international community. From the declaration of the State of Emergency (July 1985), the French government decided to suspend all new investment. It recalled its ambassador and its military attaché. It referred the matter to the United Nations Security Council to obtain the adoption, on July 26, 1985, of Resolution 569 which called on member states to take restrictive measures against the country where the odious system of Apartheid is maintained…”
Comoros - Mayotte: “It is a delicate problem … We are working under conditions of exceptional mutual understanding with (Comoro) President Abdallah, who defends the position I defended in parliament in 1974… The law separating Mayotte from the independent Comoros is an error…”
One new element at the summit was the participation of a Maghreb country, Morocco, represented by King Hassan II in person. Up to then, Rabat had only been represented at a Ministerial level, as was Tunis, while Algeria had never taken part.
The Outcome
The convening of an extraordinary session of the United Nations on African debt: France backed and supported the OAU position because “we had a dialogue with the acting Chairman of the OAU ( President Abdou Diouf) and we realized that our intentions converge…”
The founding of a new Africa House in Paris, which had been suggested by President Mitterrand at the 11th Summit in Bujumbura: the model of the planned building was made. The site for the new building was being studied.
Article publié le 17/02/2003
