France-Africa
Côte d’Ivoire: How to beat the crisis
The Côte d’Ivoire suffered its most serious shock since independence when rebel troops attacked Abidjan on September 19, 2002. The reconstruction effort that will have to be undertaken both on the domestic front and on the regional level will be decisive for future stability in West Africa.
The first-ever coup d’Etat in the country’s history occurred in December 1999, after a long period of tensions and decay in the regime of president Henri Konan Bedie. Organised in apparent confusion and dominated by military factions, the coup was followed by a transitory period under military rule until new presidential elections were held in October 2000. A worsening of political instability highlighted the administration led by General Robert Guei, accompanied by increased uncertainties in the play of alliances between the country’s political forces, a deteriorating economic and financial situation and a breakdown in relations with the principal donors of aid, as well as divisions among the military and a weakening of the armed forces.
The presidential elections in October 2000 brought Laurent Gbagbo and his Ivorian People’s Front (FPI) to power, and marked the start of a process aimed at restoring the constitutional order, but which was highlighted by major difficulties in overcoming the tensions and divisions left over from the transition period under Gen. Guei. In particular, former Premier Alassane Ouattara and his followers in the RDR party, and more broadly the largely Muslim populations in the North and the country’s large immigrant communities felt excluded.
The discovery of a mass grave at Yopougon, the strong fears caused among the population by the virtually uncontrollable police and armed forces, the exclusion of Alassane Ouattara and the RDR’s decision not to take part in the legislative elections, as well as the disorders on December 4-5, 2000, illustrated the fragility and the vulnerability of the process aimed at restoring democracy. An attempt to destabilise the regime on January 7-8, 2001, signalled the type of risks facing Côte d’Ivoire. The aggressors, including many former military men and benefiting from foreign complicities, revealed the extreme weakness of the Ivorian army.
In parallel, efforts were made to resume relations with the international financial institutions and the donor community, and a Forum for national reconciliation resulted in the return to Abidjan of all major political leaders and the recognition of Alassane Ouattara’s Ivorian nationality. These developments appeared as positive and encouraging signs in an otherwise disquieting context. The bilateral partners, above all France, the European Union, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, all showed awareness of the need to restore stability before tackling the underlying causes of the Ivorian crisis.
The September 19 shock
Efforts to restore political stability, marked by the local elections in July 2002 in which all political parties took part – even though the participation rate was low and voting rights limited to the holders of a national identity card distributed in questionable conditions – came to naught on September 19.
The coordinated attack on Abidjan by the rebels from Bouake and the disastrous shortcomings of the Ivoirian armed forces created a civil war situation, the most serious aspect of which was that it would last for several months, contrary to the most serious events during the period since Christmas 1999.
Beyond the discussion of whether this was a home-grown conflict or an external aggression, it seems undeniable that internal difficulties and vulnerabilities in the Côte d’Ivoire facilitated the spread into this country of the effects of the process of "regionalisation" of war and violence elsewhere in West Africa. This process had been generated since 1989 by the war in Liberia, followed in 1991 by the Sierra Leone conflict, and the extension of the crisis from 2000 into Guinea, reflecting the growth in the sub-region of a contagious and multi-faceted "system of conflicts".
On the other hand, because of the essential economic role played by Côte d’Ivoire in the sub-region, the impact of the crisis on neighbouring countries was quickly seen as a matter for concern which made it all the more urgent to seek a rapid political solution to the conflict and an immediate end to military operations.
Côte d’Ivoire has since September 2002 been virtually split into two. In the north and west, the armed opposition movements, the MPCI and later the MPIGO and the MJP, heavily armed and well covered by the media, equipped with means of transport and communications, have dug in along the frontiers from Burkina Faso to Liberia. In the centre and the south, the legitimate government has reinforced its faltering army with foreign mercenaries and new equipment bought in a hurry after the crisis erupted. This de facto partition of the country, which became more solidly established as the weeks passed by, quickly became a major concern in the efforts to hammer out a political solution. The authorities insist on the need to restore constitutional order and disarm and regroup the rebels in quartering areas in order to rebuild the country’s unity. Their armed opponents take advantage of their military gains to impose their participation in the negotiations and seek significant political concessions.
Which political solutions?
France’s military and political engagement has been decisive, first in preventing the conflict from escalating into a full-scale civil war, and, next, in maintaining an international mobilisation designed to facilitate negotiations. It also kept up pressure on all sides to bring them together for genuine political negotiations that began on January 15, 2003. The deployment of 2,500 French troops, the travels by the French foreign minister to Côte d’Ivoire and in the region and the direct involvement of the French president have clearly helped to avoid a stalemate.
As soon as the crisis began, Paris came out in favour of an approach giving priority to an African political and military intervention involving the ECOWAS and key chiefs of state of the sub-region. On the military level, the difficulties in deploying a major peacekeeping force capable of intervening efficiently in an autonomous manner demonstrated the limitations of an exclusively African solution. It showed that much remains to be done before the Africans themselves, the United Nations and the big powers can set up a crisis management system that will not marginalize the African states. On the political and diplomatic levels, the rivalries generated by various African mediation attempts – the Lome talks sponsored by president Gnassingbe Eyadema, those launched by Senegal’s Abdoulaye Wade, the acting ECOWAS chairman, or the more limited attempts by Mali and Ghana – have undeniably also involved a risk of stalemate in the crisis.
However, beyond the urgency of achieving a ceasefire or a political deal that would shelter Côte d’Ivoire from open civil war, a long haul effort will be needed to solve the underlying problems, with a bearing on the institutions, the armed forces, democratisation, the role of the media, and such issues as nationality, land ownership and regional cooperation.
The presidential elections in October 2000 brought Laurent Gbagbo and his Ivorian People’s Front (FPI) to power, and marked the start of a process aimed at restoring the constitutional order, but which was highlighted by major difficulties in overcoming the tensions and divisions left over from the transition period under Gen. Guei. In particular, former Premier Alassane Ouattara and his followers in the RDR party, and more broadly the largely Muslim populations in the North and the country’s large immigrant communities felt excluded.
The discovery of a mass grave at Yopougon, the strong fears caused among the population by the virtually uncontrollable police and armed forces, the exclusion of Alassane Ouattara and the RDR’s decision not to take part in the legislative elections, as well as the disorders on December 4-5, 2000, illustrated the fragility and the vulnerability of the process aimed at restoring democracy. An attempt to destabilise the regime on January 7-8, 2001, signalled the type of risks facing Côte d’Ivoire. The aggressors, including many former military men and benefiting from foreign complicities, revealed the extreme weakness of the Ivorian army.
In parallel, efforts were made to resume relations with the international financial institutions and the donor community, and a Forum for national reconciliation resulted in the return to Abidjan of all major political leaders and the recognition of Alassane Ouattara’s Ivorian nationality. These developments appeared as positive and encouraging signs in an otherwise disquieting context. The bilateral partners, above all France, the European Union, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, all showed awareness of the need to restore stability before tackling the underlying causes of the Ivorian crisis.
The September 19 shock
Efforts to restore political stability, marked by the local elections in July 2002 in which all political parties took part – even though the participation rate was low and voting rights limited to the holders of a national identity card distributed in questionable conditions – came to naught on September 19.
The coordinated attack on Abidjan by the rebels from Bouake and the disastrous shortcomings of the Ivoirian armed forces created a civil war situation, the most serious aspect of which was that it would last for several months, contrary to the most serious events during the period since Christmas 1999.
Beyond the discussion of whether this was a home-grown conflict or an external aggression, it seems undeniable that internal difficulties and vulnerabilities in the Côte d’Ivoire facilitated the spread into this country of the effects of the process of "regionalisation" of war and violence elsewhere in West Africa. This process had been generated since 1989 by the war in Liberia, followed in 1991 by the Sierra Leone conflict, and the extension of the crisis from 2000 into Guinea, reflecting the growth in the sub-region of a contagious and multi-faceted "system of conflicts".
On the other hand, because of the essential economic role played by Côte d’Ivoire in the sub-region, the impact of the crisis on neighbouring countries was quickly seen as a matter for concern which made it all the more urgent to seek a rapid political solution to the conflict and an immediate end to military operations.
Côte d’Ivoire has since September 2002 been virtually split into two. In the north and west, the armed opposition movements, the MPCI and later the MPIGO and the MJP, heavily armed and well covered by the media, equipped with means of transport and communications, have dug in along the frontiers from Burkina Faso to Liberia. In the centre and the south, the legitimate government has reinforced its faltering army with foreign mercenaries and new equipment bought in a hurry after the crisis erupted. This de facto partition of the country, which became more solidly established as the weeks passed by, quickly became a major concern in the efforts to hammer out a political solution. The authorities insist on the need to restore constitutional order and disarm and regroup the rebels in quartering areas in order to rebuild the country’s unity. Their armed opponents take advantage of their military gains to impose their participation in the negotiations and seek significant political concessions.
Which political solutions?
France’s military and political engagement has been decisive, first in preventing the conflict from escalating into a full-scale civil war, and, next, in maintaining an international mobilisation designed to facilitate negotiations. It also kept up pressure on all sides to bring them together for genuine political negotiations that began on January 15, 2003. The deployment of 2,500 French troops, the travels by the French foreign minister to Côte d’Ivoire and in the region and the direct involvement of the French president have clearly helped to avoid a stalemate.
As soon as the crisis began, Paris came out in favour of an approach giving priority to an African political and military intervention involving the ECOWAS and key chiefs of state of the sub-region. On the military level, the difficulties in deploying a major peacekeeping force capable of intervening efficiently in an autonomous manner demonstrated the limitations of an exclusively African solution. It showed that much remains to be done before the Africans themselves, the United Nations and the big powers can set up a crisis management system that will not marginalize the African states. On the political and diplomatic levels, the rivalries generated by various African mediation attempts – the Lome talks sponsored by president Gnassingbe Eyadema, those launched by Senegal’s Abdoulaye Wade, the acting ECOWAS chairman, or the more limited attempts by Mali and Ghana – have undeniably also involved a risk of stalemate in the crisis.
However, beyond the urgency of achieving a ceasefire or a political deal that would shelter Côte d’Ivoire from open civil war, a long haul effort will be needed to solve the underlying problems, with a bearing on the institutions, the armed forces, democratisation, the role of the media, and such issues as nationality, land ownership and regional cooperation.
par Jean-Paul Hughes
Article publié le 17/02/2003
