France-Africa
Military Cooperation: The big turnaround
French military cooperation with Africa, once seen as spearheading France’s policy in the continent, has undergone profound changes over the past few years. Both budget resources and the troop strength involved have trended downward, calling into question the very foundations of its action.
Since the independence of the African states, France’s military cooperation with its partners in the continent has never faced upheavals of this magnitude. Recent developments in this field have been profoundly influenced by a series of major factors. Two reforms have had a significant impact. First, the reform of the French armed forces and the redefinition of French defence policy in 1997-98, in a context of cutbacks in military spending. Second, the 1998 reform of cooperation itself, when the former Cooperation Ministry was integrated into the Foreign Ministry, which resulted notably in the scrapping of the Military Cooperation Mission which was in charge of the African countries of the "champ" – broadly, the former French colonies – and the establishment in the Foreign Ministry of a new Military Cooperation and Defence Directorate covering a broader field and a broader geographical area.
A new doctrine
The new guidelines for military cooperation with Africa, adopted by the Defence Council on May 3, 1998, are situated within the framework of a new, broader doctrine based on several major principles: a more restrictive recourse to bilateral military interventions, limited in principle to ensuring the security of French nationals; a reduced permanent presence of French forces in Africa (reflected notably by the closing down of French military installations in the Central African Republic); a "multilateralisation" of the French approach to new forms of insecurity in the continent, in particular through the United Nations; and support for Africans’ own efforts to take over the management of crises and conflicts – which has translated into the setting up of RECAMP, the programme for a strengthening of African peacekeeping capacities – and for further "regionalisation" – involving the creation of multiple national military schools on a regional basis, which has, over a period of a few years, become the key structure for the policy of African military training backed by France.
The 1998 reform was implemented after a period of considerable discussion in France about past practises. Although the French "military umbrella" had worked rather well and contributed to limiting both conflicts and military spending, from the time of the independences until the upheavals of the Cold War or the fears of Libyan ambitions, the 1990s constituted a major turning point.
The shock of the Rwandan tragedy
The Rwandan tragedy, the malfunctioning on some points of the military cooperation with Rwanda and the public debate on Operation Turquoise caused a major shock. But the process of democratisation in Africa also had a strong impact; it triggered a series of decisions to suspend military cooperation, with the then Zaire in 1991, Togo in 1992, and as from 1996 Niger, Burundi, Congo-Brazzaville, the Comoro republic, Guinea-Bissau, and even Côte d’Ivoire, as a result of the 1999 coup d’Etat. Against this background, Paris has over the years increasingly tended to situate its military cooperation within a framework more strongly determined by international decisions – by the United Nations, the European Union or the Organisation of African Unity, turned into the African Union (UA) – linked to conflict management or democratic practices.
In the event, the changes since 1998 have also favoured a significant redeployment of this military cooperation beyond France’s traditional partners. First, in the direction of non-francophone African states such as Nigeria, South Africa, Ghana and Ethiopia. And then towards the Maghreb and the Middle East. There has also been an extension towards the eastern and central European countries in the context of the broadening of the membership of the European Union and NATO. Also worthy of notice is the rapprochement with the United States and Britain with a view to strengthening cooperation in support of African peacekeeping capacities.
This overhaul has not had any marked impact on the military cooperation and technical assistance agreements concluded by France with 25 countries of sub-Saharan Africa. A more stringent and more concerted management system has been developed and implemented within the framework of more clearly defined projects. At the same time, there has been no review or formal renegotiation of any of the defence agreements, public or secret, concluded with a limited number of African countries. France has visibly not wanted to hint at any form of disengagement in this field.
Budget cuts
The recent upheavals in military cooperation have their strongest impact on the budgetary level. In 1990, the then Military Cooperation Mission managed a budget of about 900 million francs (137 million euros) for spending related to France’s traditional partners in French-speaking Africa, and the number of military advisers or technicians in the continent totalled 925 men. In 1997, just before the reforms, the credits were down to 739 million francs (112.5 million euros) and the strength of military assistance personnel was reduced to 640 men. In 2002, Africa’s share in a total budget of 104.7 million euros represented 75 million, and the staffing level was down to 300 our of a worldwide total of 392. In 2003, the total budget for French military cooperation should rise to 94.3 million euros, of which roughly two-thirds have been set aside for the African continent as a whole. A special feature of the current budget is sizable cut of nearly 40 percent in credits set aside for military and defence cooperation with regional organisations.
France certainly remains active in the prevention and resolution of African conflicts, through the RECAMP programme or its participation in UN peacekeeping operations, such as the MONUC in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The marked decline in credits and staffing levels nonetheless constitutes a concrete measure of the underlying evolution of French military cooperation in Africa. The case of the Central African Republic, where France no longer has more than a dozen military advisers with a low-profile brief, is significant in this respect. Beyond the intervention of some 2,500 men at the end of 2002, the case of Côte d’Ivoire will over time be the real test that will confirm whether the change in French military cooperation policy is here to stay or not.
A new doctrine
The new guidelines for military cooperation with Africa, adopted by the Defence Council on May 3, 1998, are situated within the framework of a new, broader doctrine based on several major principles: a more restrictive recourse to bilateral military interventions, limited in principle to ensuring the security of French nationals; a reduced permanent presence of French forces in Africa (reflected notably by the closing down of French military installations in the Central African Republic); a "multilateralisation" of the French approach to new forms of insecurity in the continent, in particular through the United Nations; and support for Africans’ own efforts to take over the management of crises and conflicts – which has translated into the setting up of RECAMP, the programme for a strengthening of African peacekeeping capacities – and for further "regionalisation" – involving the creation of multiple national military schools on a regional basis, which has, over a period of a few years, become the key structure for the policy of African military training backed by France.
The 1998 reform was implemented after a period of considerable discussion in France about past practises. Although the French "military umbrella" had worked rather well and contributed to limiting both conflicts and military spending, from the time of the independences until the upheavals of the Cold War or the fears of Libyan ambitions, the 1990s constituted a major turning point.
The shock of the Rwandan tragedy
The Rwandan tragedy, the malfunctioning on some points of the military cooperation with Rwanda and the public debate on Operation Turquoise caused a major shock. But the process of democratisation in Africa also had a strong impact; it triggered a series of decisions to suspend military cooperation, with the then Zaire in 1991, Togo in 1992, and as from 1996 Niger, Burundi, Congo-Brazzaville, the Comoro republic, Guinea-Bissau, and even Côte d’Ivoire, as a result of the 1999 coup d’Etat. Against this background, Paris has over the years increasingly tended to situate its military cooperation within a framework more strongly determined by international decisions – by the United Nations, the European Union or the Organisation of African Unity, turned into the African Union (UA) – linked to conflict management or democratic practices.
In the event, the changes since 1998 have also favoured a significant redeployment of this military cooperation beyond France’s traditional partners. First, in the direction of non-francophone African states such as Nigeria, South Africa, Ghana and Ethiopia. And then towards the Maghreb and the Middle East. There has also been an extension towards the eastern and central European countries in the context of the broadening of the membership of the European Union and NATO. Also worthy of notice is the rapprochement with the United States and Britain with a view to strengthening cooperation in support of African peacekeeping capacities.
This overhaul has not had any marked impact on the military cooperation and technical assistance agreements concluded by France with 25 countries of sub-Saharan Africa. A more stringent and more concerted management system has been developed and implemented within the framework of more clearly defined projects. At the same time, there has been no review or formal renegotiation of any of the defence agreements, public or secret, concluded with a limited number of African countries. France has visibly not wanted to hint at any form of disengagement in this field.
Budget cuts
The recent upheavals in military cooperation have their strongest impact on the budgetary level. In 1990, the then Military Cooperation Mission managed a budget of about 900 million francs (137 million euros) for spending related to France’s traditional partners in French-speaking Africa, and the number of military advisers or technicians in the continent totalled 925 men. In 1997, just before the reforms, the credits were down to 739 million francs (112.5 million euros) and the strength of military assistance personnel was reduced to 640 men. In 2002, Africa’s share in a total budget of 104.7 million euros represented 75 million, and the staffing level was down to 300 our of a worldwide total of 392. In 2003, the total budget for French military cooperation should rise to 94.3 million euros, of which roughly two-thirds have been set aside for the African continent as a whole. A special feature of the current budget is sizable cut of nearly 40 percent in credits set aside for military and defence cooperation with regional organisations.
France certainly remains active in the prevention and resolution of African conflicts, through the RECAMP programme or its participation in UN peacekeeping operations, such as the MONUC in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The marked decline in credits and staffing levels nonetheless constitutes a concrete measure of the underlying evolution of French military cooperation in Africa. The case of the Central African Republic, where France no longer has more than a dozen military advisers with a low-profile brief, is significant in this respect. Beyond the intervention of some 2,500 men at the end of 2002, the case of Côte d’Ivoire will over time be the real test that will confirm whether the change in French military cooperation policy is here to stay or not.
par Jean-Paul Hughes
Article publié le 17/02/2003
