France-Africa
CAR: Fragile dialogue
As of mid-January 2003, the rebels who staged the attempted putsch in October 2002 were still in control of large swathes of CAR territory, completely cut off from Bangui, the capital. The self-avowed coup leader was the former Chief of Staff, General François Bozize In a report to the Security Council in early January, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan says that the presence of armed rebels in the north of the CAR, combined with the deprivations faced by local populations and the displaced constitute " elements of major destabilisation."
The latest coup attempt shows the difficulty of achieving a dialogue between an authority tending to isolate itself and an opposition that is struggling to maintain its cohesion, in a country beset by serious economic crisis generating tensions and repeated strikes. But it also shows how the CAR is open to the impact of regional struggles for influence, and the conflicts that have been raging for years in neighbouring countries except Cameroun – Chad in the north, Sudan in the east and the two Congos in the south.
Patasse twice rescued by Libyan and MLC troops
The social and political climate remained deleterious in Bangui despite the signing in 1998 of the National Reconciliation Pact, which committed the authorities, the political parties and civil society leaders to "implementing good governance, excluding nepotism, clannism…and embezzlements" and to "facilitate the settlement of all differences… through dialogue." In April 2000, an opposition motion of no confidence was rejected in parliament; at the end of the year, demonstrations by government workers demanding payment of wage arrears turned into open protest against the regime. This landlocked country – rated in 165th position out of 173 countries on the UNDP’s human development index – is saddled with poor economic fundamentals in spite of the government’s efforts: weak public finances, a foreign debt touching $800 million, poorly managed coffee, cotton and timber sectors, wages several months in arrears…
The situation worsens one notch further with the May 28, 2001, attempted coup involving former president André Kolingba. At the request of Ange-Felix Patasse, Libyan troops intervene, within the framework of the Community of Sahelian-Saharan States (COMESSA) of which the CAR is a member. And units of Jean-Pierre Bemba’s Congolese Liberation Movement (MLC) cross the Ubangui River from the Democratic Republic of Congo. When Gen. Bozize’s forces move in from Chad for another coup attempt last October, Libyan and MLC troops again defend the Patasse regime. Exactions reportedly committed by the MLC fighters – some 1,500 men accused of having "paid" themselves by plundering civilian property, and of committing rapes – are widely denounced.
The Libyan intervention had the merit of taking place within the sub-regional framework of the COMESSA, though it was certainly not devoid of ulterior motives – it must have pleased Colonel Moammar Kadhafi to be able to challenge Chad’s Idriss Deby, whom he is fighting through the MDJT rebellion in the Ennedi region, from the south. The involvement of Jean-Pierre Bemba’s troops, however, has a more personal background: the MLC chief feels indebted to Ange-Felix Patasse for having refused to allow then DRC president Laurent-Desire Kabila to send troops via the CAR to attack the MLC from the rear. The CAR is, furthermore, the only practical supply route for the area in the northern DRC controlled by Bemba.
The date of the departure of the MLC force, first reported by Bangui as early November, then set at February 15 by Jean-Pierre Bemba, remains uncertain. The COMESSA force, on the other hand, withdrew at the end of December 2002. The Libyan withdrawal coincided with the arrival of a force of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC): a Congolese contingent in mid-January joined the Gabonese units deployed on the ground a few weeks earlier. The mission of the CEMAC force consists in protecting president Patasse, restructuring the CAR army and, above all, monitoring the CAR-Chadian border.
Bongo mediation
By attacking Bangui last October, says Kofi Annan in his report, Gen. Bozize’s followers effectively "compromised the relative stability and the gradual easing of relations between Chad and the Central African Republic." Relations were indeed easing, notably as a result of the mediation engaged by Gabon’s president Omar Bongo. Tensions erupted in November 2001, when Gen. Bozize, fired by president Patasse, sought refuge in Chad with his men. Since then, the two neighbours have mutually accused each other of frontier violations and there have been some frontier incidents. The presence in the CAR of Martin Komtan Madji, suspected by N’djamena of being in fact a former Chadian rebel chief, Abdoulaye Miskine, has contributed to the escalation of tension.
A special CEMAC summit at Libreville on October 2, 2002, then decided to deploy a 300 strong force in the CAR within a month in order to ease tensions with Chad. The summit recommended the expulsion of Gen. Bozize by N’djamena and asked Bangui to do likewise as regards Martin Komtan Madji. Togo on October 13 agreed to grant him asylum, and he finally arrived there in early November. France, which supports the CEMAC mediation and "seeks to participate in the implementation of these recommendations", in turn, received François Bozize. The deployment of the CEMAC force, delayed by the fighting in Bangui in October, began in early December, with France providing logistical and financial support.
National dialogue in the end, long called for by the opposition
These developments did not prevent president Patasse from issuing on December 31 "an urgent and formal appeal to France for a French military presence alongside the CAR army and the CEMAC force in order to help us restore our territorial integrity… as it is doing at present in Côte d’Ivoire." The president also affirmed that a French presence would enable the CAR to exploit the oil-rich zones in the north. However, such a presence is not currently justified in the view of Paris, which sticks to "the simple principle of supporting African mediations" and backing national dialogue. There are fewer than 1,400 registered French residents in the CAR.
A month after the Bangui attack, president Patasse issued a call for national dialogue, which the opposition has been demanding for a long time. A committee to coordinate the national dialogue was set up at the end of December, under the leadership of Monsignor Paulin Pomodimo, chairman of the Bishops’ Conference. The UN Security Council early in January urged the CAR authorities to "create the conditions for a global, non-exclusive dialogue." The date and venue of this inter-CAR dialogue are under discussion. Legislative elections are normally scheduled for next December. Meanwhile, a joint Chad-CAR commission meeting has been set for February in Libreville.
The latest coup attempt shows the difficulty of achieving a dialogue between an authority tending to isolate itself and an opposition that is struggling to maintain its cohesion, in a country beset by serious economic crisis generating tensions and repeated strikes. But it also shows how the CAR is open to the impact of regional struggles for influence, and the conflicts that have been raging for years in neighbouring countries except Cameroun – Chad in the north, Sudan in the east and the two Congos in the south.
Patasse twice rescued by Libyan and MLC troops
The social and political climate remained deleterious in Bangui despite the signing in 1998 of the National Reconciliation Pact, which committed the authorities, the political parties and civil society leaders to "implementing good governance, excluding nepotism, clannism…and embezzlements" and to "facilitate the settlement of all differences… through dialogue." In April 2000, an opposition motion of no confidence was rejected in parliament; at the end of the year, demonstrations by government workers demanding payment of wage arrears turned into open protest against the regime. This landlocked country – rated in 165th position out of 173 countries on the UNDP’s human development index – is saddled with poor economic fundamentals in spite of the government’s efforts: weak public finances, a foreign debt touching $800 million, poorly managed coffee, cotton and timber sectors, wages several months in arrears…
The situation worsens one notch further with the May 28, 2001, attempted coup involving former president André Kolingba. At the request of Ange-Felix Patasse, Libyan troops intervene, within the framework of the Community of Sahelian-Saharan States (COMESSA) of which the CAR is a member. And units of Jean-Pierre Bemba’s Congolese Liberation Movement (MLC) cross the Ubangui River from the Democratic Republic of Congo. When Gen. Bozize’s forces move in from Chad for another coup attempt last October, Libyan and MLC troops again defend the Patasse regime. Exactions reportedly committed by the MLC fighters – some 1,500 men accused of having "paid" themselves by plundering civilian property, and of committing rapes – are widely denounced.
The Libyan intervention had the merit of taking place within the sub-regional framework of the COMESSA, though it was certainly not devoid of ulterior motives – it must have pleased Colonel Moammar Kadhafi to be able to challenge Chad’s Idriss Deby, whom he is fighting through the MDJT rebellion in the Ennedi region, from the south. The involvement of Jean-Pierre Bemba’s troops, however, has a more personal background: the MLC chief feels indebted to Ange-Felix Patasse for having refused to allow then DRC president Laurent-Desire Kabila to send troops via the CAR to attack the MLC from the rear. The CAR is, furthermore, the only practical supply route for the area in the northern DRC controlled by Bemba.
The date of the departure of the MLC force, first reported by Bangui as early November, then set at February 15 by Jean-Pierre Bemba, remains uncertain. The COMESSA force, on the other hand, withdrew at the end of December 2002. The Libyan withdrawal coincided with the arrival of a force of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC): a Congolese contingent in mid-January joined the Gabonese units deployed on the ground a few weeks earlier. The mission of the CEMAC force consists in protecting president Patasse, restructuring the CAR army and, above all, monitoring the CAR-Chadian border.
Bongo mediation
By attacking Bangui last October, says Kofi Annan in his report, Gen. Bozize’s followers effectively "compromised the relative stability and the gradual easing of relations between Chad and the Central African Republic." Relations were indeed easing, notably as a result of the mediation engaged by Gabon’s president Omar Bongo. Tensions erupted in November 2001, when Gen. Bozize, fired by president Patasse, sought refuge in Chad with his men. Since then, the two neighbours have mutually accused each other of frontier violations and there have been some frontier incidents. The presence in the CAR of Martin Komtan Madji, suspected by N’djamena of being in fact a former Chadian rebel chief, Abdoulaye Miskine, has contributed to the escalation of tension.
A special CEMAC summit at Libreville on October 2, 2002, then decided to deploy a 300 strong force in the CAR within a month in order to ease tensions with Chad. The summit recommended the expulsion of Gen. Bozize by N’djamena and asked Bangui to do likewise as regards Martin Komtan Madji. Togo on October 13 agreed to grant him asylum, and he finally arrived there in early November. France, which supports the CEMAC mediation and "seeks to participate in the implementation of these recommendations", in turn, received François Bozize. The deployment of the CEMAC force, delayed by the fighting in Bangui in October, began in early December, with France providing logistical and financial support.
National dialogue in the end, long called for by the opposition
These developments did not prevent president Patasse from issuing on December 31 "an urgent and formal appeal to France for a French military presence alongside the CAR army and the CEMAC force in order to help us restore our territorial integrity… as it is doing at present in Côte d’Ivoire." The president also affirmed that a French presence would enable the CAR to exploit the oil-rich zones in the north. However, such a presence is not currently justified in the view of Paris, which sticks to "the simple principle of supporting African mediations" and backing national dialogue. There are fewer than 1,400 registered French residents in the CAR.
A month after the Bangui attack, president Patasse issued a call for national dialogue, which the opposition has been demanding for a long time. A committee to coordinate the national dialogue was set up at the end of December, under the leadership of Monsignor Paulin Pomodimo, chairman of the Bishops’ Conference. The UN Security Council early in January urged the CAR authorities to "create the conditions for a global, non-exclusive dialogue." The date and venue of this inter-CAR dialogue are under discussion. Legislative elections are normally scheduled for next December. Meanwhile, a joint Chad-CAR commission meeting has been set for February in Libreville.
Peace Missions
Inter-African Mission of Surveillance of the Bangui accords (MISAB).
After three military mutinies in 1996, the 19th France-Africa summit at Ouagadougou gave Chad, Gabon, Mali and Burkina Faso a mandate to carry out a mediation mission in Bangui. The mission set up an international follow-up committee chaired by Amadou Toumani Toure of Mali. Negotiations resulted in the conclusion of the Bangui accords on January 25, 1997, establishing the MISAB force, immediately deployed. Its mission was to monitor the implementation of the accords, take part in the disarming of the rebel units, and maintain security in the capital. The UN Security Council in August 1997 approved the extension of the MISAB mission.
United Nations Mission in the CAR (MINURCA).
The MINURCA, established by UNSC resolution 1159, took over from the MISAB on April 15, 1998. Its brief was to maintain and reinforce security, stability and freedom of movement in Bangui, to protect key installations and to monitor arms stocks. The force consisted of 1,350 men under the command of General Ratanga of Gabon (now in charge of the CEMAC force in Bangui). France provided the logistics. The Security Council later broadened the MINURCA to include support for the organisation or legislative and, subsequently, presidential elections. The force remained in the CAR until January 15, 2000.
UN Office for the Consolidation of Peace in the CAR (BONUCA). The BONUCA, which succeeded the MINURCA in January 2000, was first established for one year. Its main mission was to support the government’s efforts to consolidate peace and national reconciliation, strengthen democratic institutions and facilitate the international mobilisation of political backing and resources for reconstruction and economic recovery. Its mandate has been renewed.
par Ariane Poissonnier
Article publié le 17/02/2003
